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THE POTENTIAL COMPETITION DOCTRINE:
THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT'S ANTITRUST WEAPON
UNDER SECTION 7 OF THE CLAYTON ACT
INTRODUCTION*
Monopolistic practices such as the Whiskey Trust, the Standard Oil Trust and the Sugar Trust led to the enactment in 1890
of the Sherman Antitrust Act.1 However it soon became apparent that the thrust of this Act, prohibiting present unreasonable restraints of trade, was not broad enough. 2 The demand
for more comprehensive antitrust legislation was met by the passage of the Clayton Act in 1914.3 This Act was intended to
supplement the Sherman Antitrust Act by " . . .cop[ing] with
monopolistic tendencies in their incipiency and well before they
have attained such effects as justify a Sherman Act proceeding.
"4

Throughout the struggle between the Government and big
business, the number of different theories used by business to
avoid conviction under the antitrust laws have been limited only
by the imaginations of corporate legal departments. As a result,
the Justice Department has had to remain flexible in its pursuit
of antitrust violators.
One of the more successful weapons in the Justice Depart* This comment was written and accepted for publication while the
author was still a student at John Marshall Law School. Mr. Dorigan
graduated with honors in February 1975. He isa member of the Minnesota Bar and is now an associate with a law firm in Minneapolis, Minnesota.

1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-8 (1973).

2. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). See generPRIMER IN THE LAW OF MERGERS 147-51 (1973).
3. 15 Ui.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1973) [hereinafter cited as the Clayton Act].
The potential competition doctrine is derived from section seven of the
Clayton Act and as set forth in 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1958) provides in relevant
part: No corporation
engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly
or
indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital
and no corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade
Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where in any line of
commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition
may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.
No corporation shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or
any part of the stock or other share capital and no corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of one or more corporations
engaged in commerce, where in any line of commerce in any section
of the country, the effect of such acquisition, of such stock or assets,
or of the use of such stock by the voting or granting of proxies or
otherwise, may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to
create a monopoly.
4. S.Rep. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1950).

ally KINTER
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ment's arsenal has been the potential competition doctrine. The
underlying rationale upon which this theory is based is that certain corporate acquisitions or mergers, if allowed, will have such
an inhibiting effect on potential market entrants that the market
will eventually be devoid of all competition. Therefore, to preserve competition, the acquisition or merger is challenged. This
doctrine first made its appearance in United States v. El Paso
Natural Gas Co.5 and has been relied upon by the federal government in several key subsequent cases. 6
Only in the area of banking has the potential competition
argument met with resistance. 7 The United States Supreme
Court, in United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc.8 recognized that the potential competition doctrine applies to banking
as well. Notwithstanding this acceptance, the Court went on to
limit the doctrine as applicable to bank merger and acquisition
cases.
Marine Bancorporationis the first significant Supreme Court
limitation of the doctrine. It is also the first banking case in
which the potential competition doctrine has been treated by the
Supreme Court.9 The ultimate function of this discussion will
be to suggest the possible directions that the potential competition theory might take within the overall antitrust scheme.

THE DOCTRINE OF POTENTIAL COMPETITION
The potential competition doctrine basically holds that an
acquisition or merger can be violative of the antitrust laws, speci5. 376 U.S. 651, 659 (1964). This action was brought as a civil suit
charging a violation of § 7 of the Clayton Act due to the acquisition by
El Paso Natural Gas Company of the stock and assets of Pacific Northwest Pipeline Corp. The United States Supreme Court ruled that the acquisition substantially lessened competition in the sale of natural gas in
Calfornia. Mr. Justice Douglas, in his majority opinion, seemed only to
flirt with the doctrine of potential competition. However, the seeds of
the doctrine were implanted in this case for later harvest by the Justice
Department.
6. United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526 (1973); Ford
Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562 (1972); FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967); United States v. Continental Can Co., 378
U.S. 441 (1964); and United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co., 378 U.S.
158 (1964).
7. See United States v. First National Bancorporation, Inc., 329 F.
Supp. 1003 (Colo. 1971); United States v. Idaho First National Bank, 315
F. Supp. 261 (Idaho 1970); United States v. First National Bank, 310 F.
Supp. 157 (Md. 1970); United States v. First National Bank, 301 F. Supp.
1161 (S.D. Miss. 1969); United States v. Crocker-Anglo National Bank,
277 F. Supp. 133 (N.D. Cal. 1967).
8. 418 U.S. 602 (1974).
9. The First National Bancorporation,Inc. case, note 7 supra, was
affirmed on appeal by the Supreme Court in a four to four, one-line decision. As a result, one can only speculate as to what treatment was bestowed upon the potential competition doctrine by the Court. Thus, Marine Bancorporationis the first opinion issued by the Court concerning
the theory.
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fically § 7 of the Clayton Act, even when no present competition
is eliminated by the acquisition or merger. The violation occurs
when, as a result of the acquisition or merger, the acquiring corporation ceases to be a pro-competitive influence on other businesses in that specific market. The doctrine is applicable in
instances of proposed market extensions where the acquiring
company is not currently a participant in a specific market but
seeks to become a participant as a result of the acquisition.' 0
"[T]he principal focus of the doctrine is on the likely effects
of the premerger position of the acquired firm on the fringe of
the target market.""
Theoretically, within a given geographical market, competition between businesses already participating in that market will
be encouraged by the threat that another large and powerful
company in the same product line is "waiting in the wings" for
some inducement to enter their market. Therefore, these businesses will react to this threat by acting with caution in the
setting of prices and profits, thus making the cost of entering
the market prohibitive. 12 The end result is that the corporation
on the edge of the market serves as a competitive influence because firms within the market perceive it as likely to enter if
business becomes too appealing.
Another potential competition situation in which the Justice
Department has sought to deny mergers and acquisitions occurs
when a probable market entrant seeks to acquire an already
dominant firm in that market. Here, the Government argues,
potential competition is lost because the more preferable method
of entry should be either de novo or through acquisition of a
smaller firm in the market. 13 It is contended that the latter
method of entry will provide a future competitive effect, whereas
the acquisition of an already dominant firm will lead to eventual
entrenchment in the market. This entrenchment, it is alleged,
10. See United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526 (1973);
Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562 (1972); FTC v. Procter &
Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967); United States v. Continental Can Co.,
378 U.S. 441 (1964); United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co., 378 U.S.
158 (1964).
11. Note 8 supra at 624.
12. See generally F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL
221-22 (1970).

MARKET STRucTURE AND Eco-

NOMIC PERFORMANCE

13. This is the argument presented in United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., note 8 supra. Under this rationale, the acquiring firm
provides a "shot in the arm' to the market by its presence through acquisition of a smaller firm or through the opening of a new (de novo)
branch or subsidiary. The Government contends that this is the only
real way that a large firm should be allowed entry in most circumstances. The Justice Department argues that the approval of a merger
or acquisition whereby an already dominant force is acquired, will
thwart this "shot in the arm" effect and result in eventual stifling of
competition.
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results from the fact that the acquiring firm will ultimately
possess such a large percentage of the market's business that future probable entrants into the market will be discouraged from
seeking entry.
The real development of the potential competition doctrine
lies in the cases that have discussed the theory and have utilized
it in reaching their judicial conclusions. As mentioned earlier,
the concept of "potential competition" was first enunciated in
United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co. 14 In that case, Southern California Edison sought to fill its needs for natural gas
through a purchase arrangement with a distributor of the El
Paso Natural Gas Company. However, due to certain distribution restrictions imposed by El Paso, Edison was not able to
achieve the type of agreement that it desired and so turned to
Pacific Northwest Pipeline Corp., which was able to provide gas
to Edison on more favorable terms. El Paso tendered an offer
for the shares of Pacific Northwest and, by May of 1957 had
acquired 99.87o of the outstanding stock. Shortly thereafter, the
Justice Department brought an action alleging that the acquisition violated § 7 of the Clayton Act.
The Supreme Court held that the effect of the acquisition
"may be substantially to lessen competition .... 15 under § 7.
Turning to a discussion of the relevant market areas affected,
the Court found that the sale of natural gas was a line of commerce within the meaning of § 7 and that California was a proper

section of the country. 18 Having reached this determination, the
Court then stated: "We repeat that one purpose of

§ 7 was 'to

arrest the trend toward concentration, the tendency to monopoly,
before the consumer's alternatives disappeared through merger.
'M"7

In reaching its conclusion, the Court took notice of the fact
that Pacific Northwest, through its efforts to enter the California
market, had influenced El Paso's business practices within California. Citing heavy regulation by the Federal Power Commission as a limiting factor on present competition, Mr. Justice
Douglas pointed out that the real loss of competition in this acquisition was in the loss of future bidding for the business of
expanding industrial or household use of gas due to increasing
population in the market.18
Finally, in ordering divestiture, the Court placed great
weight on the fact that not only was California a booming mar14. 376 U.S. 651, 659 (1964).

15. Id. at 657.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 659.
18. Id.
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ket, but also that Pacific Northwest stood on the edge of that
market, ready and eager to enter. 19 Thus, although it has been
argued that El Paso was an actual rather than potential competition decision, 20 clearly the concept had been introduced of a
potential competitor, sitting just outside the market, yet influencing the business practices within that market.
Shortly thereafter, the United States Supreme Court, in
United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co. 21 extended this new
theory of potential competition to a joint venture. Pennsalt
Chemicals Corporation and Olin Mathieson Chemical Corporation formed Penn-Olin for the purpose of producing and selling
sodium chlorate in the southeastern section of the country. The
Justice Department brought an action to dissolve the joint venture as violative of § 7 of the Clayton Act. The district court,
ruling that the joint venture resulted in an increase in competition in the market because of the entry of Penn-Olin, awarded
judgment for the defense.
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court's
judgment, Mr. Justice Clark stating: "There still remained for
consideration the fact that Penn-Olin eliminated the potential
competition of the corporation that might have remained at the
edge of the market, continually threatening to enter.

' 22

The

Court reasoned that the joint venture eliminated the possibility
that either of the pre-venture entities would remain in the wings
of the market and pose a competitive influence by the threat
of its entry.
The Court put great weight on the fact that both of the companies had vast resources, had expressed a previous desire to
enter the market, and had the individual know-how and capacity
to enter the market at a profit.23

Citing the El Paso decision, 24

19. The effect on competition in a particular market through acqui-

sition of another company is determined by the nature or extent of
that market and by the nearness of the absorbed company to it, that
company's eagerness to enter that market, its resourcefulness, and so
on.
Id. at 660.
20. El Paso was in reality, however, an actual-competition ... case"
(footnote omitted). United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., note
8 supra at 623. This writer tends to disagree with Mr. Justice Powell
in this interpretation of the theory underlying the El Paso decision. As
pointed out in El Paso, note 14 supra, the Court recognized that much
of the real competition for which Pacific Northwest could bid as an independent rested with the future growth of the California market. Although Pacific Northwest was an actual competitor as to the Southern
California Edison transaction, the Court seemed most concerned with the
effect of the acquisition on future competition within that market. But
see Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78
HAiv. L. REV. 1313, 1371 (1965).

21. 378 U.S. 158 (1964).
22. Id. at 173.
23. Id. at 174-75. The Court discussed the weight of proof required
for a court to rule that potential competition would be eliminated:
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the Court emphasized the effect of an "aggressive, well equipped
and well financed corporation engaged in the same or related
lines of commerce waiting anxiously to enter an oligopolistic

market ....

"25

The real significance of Penn-Olin, as it relates to § 7 and
potential competition, was that the Supreme Court was expressing concern, not so much for the effects of a business combination
on the present level of competition, but rather the possible future
effects on competition that could occur if the combination were
allowed. To prevent a future restraint, the Court expanded the
scope of § 7 by requiring as proof only a probability of a lessenig of substantial competition, rather than more subjective evidence of a present restraint. 26 Thus, as this decision reflects,
the eyes of the Court were now turned towards a consideration
of future market restraint, in addition to the weighing of present
anti-competitive activity.
In United States v. Continental Can Co., 2 7 the Court further
extended the potential competition doctrine. Continental Can
Company, the nation's second largest producer of metal containers, acquired Hazel-Atlas Glass Company, the third largest producer of glass containers in the United States. The Government
sought a divestiture order under § 7 of the Clayton Act. The
United States Supreme Court found a violation of § 7 and reversed the district court's holding that no violation had been
shown.
In that case, the defendant companies contended, inter alia,
that competition in a relevant line of commerce had not been
substantially affected since bottles and cans were not ultimately
in competition. The Supreme Court disagreed, stating: "Where
the area of effective competition cuts across industry lines, so
must the relevant line of commerce; otherwise an adequate de' 28
termination of the merger's true impact cannot be made.
The main issue concerned "end uses" of both types of containers. Continental argued that by seeking diversification into
Unless we are going to require subjective evidence, this array of
probability certainly reaches the prima facie stage. As we have indicated, to require more would be to read the statutory requirement
of reasonable probability into a requirement of certainty. This we
will not do.
Id. at 175.
24. United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964).
25. United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co., 378 U.S. 158, 174 (1964).
26. In weighing these factors the court should remember that the
mandate of the Congress is in terms of the probability of a lessening
of substantial competition, not in terms of tangible present restraint.
Id. at 177.

27. 378 U.S. 441 (1964).
28. Id. at 457 (emphasis added).
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the glass container field, competition would be strengthened. 29
The Court, however, felt that the long range effect of this diversification would eventually result in diminished competition due
to the likelihood that, were the merger denied, Hazel-Atlas would
likewise seek to diversify into the metal container market, thus
30
providing significant competition to Continental.
The Court stressed the criteria that weighed heavily in
favor of a divestiture order, recognizing that the merger should
be viewed in the context of the market involved3 ' and that both
Continental and Hazel-Atlas were already strong, stable companies which could each enter the market as competitors in either
line.32
Continental Can extended the potential competition doctrine
by holding it applicable to mergers and acquisitions wherein it
was alleged that the acquired company, were it not for the merger or acquisition, would pose a competitive threat at the edge
of the market due to the likelihood that it would diversify its
production to take advantage of the favorable market. Where
the doctrine had previously been applied only to business combinations between dealers in the same product, the doctrine was
now applicable to combinations where only the possibility of
same-product restraint of competition was alleged. Finally, also
important in the Continental Can decision was the concern expressed by the Court for the degree of concentration in the market. The majority opinion cited the fact that the relevant market
was already concentrated and that the entry of an already dominant firm by acquisition should be avoided if, as a result of the
33
acquisition, that firm would become even more powerful.
This idea of concentration in the market assumes an important role in potential competition arguments. In FTC v.
Procter & Gamble Co., 34 Procter and Gamble Co. acquired the
assets of Clorox Chemical Co. The Federal Trade Commission
charged that the acquisition violated § 7 of the Clayton Act in
that it could substantially lessen competition in the production
29. Id. at 463-64.

30. Id.
31. Market shares are the primary indicia of market power but a
judgment under § 7 is not to be made by any single qualitative or

quantitative test. The merger must be viewed functionally in the
context of the particular market involved, its structure, history and
probable future. Where a merger is of such a size as to be inherently
suspect, elaborate proof of market structure, market behavior and
probable anticompetitive effects may be dispensed with and in view
of § 7's design to prevent undue concentration. Moreover, the competition with which § 7 deals includes not only existing competition
but that which is sufficiently probable and imminent.
Id. at 458.
32. Id. at 462-63.
33. Id. at 461-62.
34. 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
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and sale of household liquid bleaches. In addition to finding the
familiar "wings"3 5' doctrine applicable, the Supreme Court
stressed the fact that Clorox was already a dominant factor in
the liquid bleach market and that, were any firm to consider
challenging Clorox in the market, acquisition by an even larger
and more powerful firm (Procter & Gamble) would certainly
raise barriers to any such challenge.3 6
In addition to expanding the element of concentration in the
market place, Procter & Gamble also introduced the concept of
"the most likely entrant". 37 Unlike the previous potential competition cases where the Court had emphasized that the subject
firms had both the ability and intent to eventually seek entry
into the relevant market, in Procter & Gamble there was no real
proof of such intent to enter by any means other than acquisition
or merger. Rather, the Court spoke in terms of Procter & Gamble being the firm most able to enter and profit thereby. Thus,
the Procter & Gamble case served to broaden the criteria used
in ascertaining if an acquisition or merger could substantially
lessen competition. Where courts had been considering both ability and intent to enter relevant markets at a later date, the criteria now applicable seemed to be limited only to ability to enter
rather than intent to enter.
By the end of the 1960's the "wings" theory of potential competition had won substantial judicial recognition. However, even
though the idea was accepted that certain companies should be
denied present market entry in order to preserve future competition, the Justice Department had not been able to win judicial
approval of the second aspect of the potential competition doctrine-de novo entry with resultant entrenchment.
In 1972, the Supreme Court decided United States v. Falstaff
35. The "wings" doctrine symbolizes the potential market entrant,
"waiting in the wings" of the market, so to speak, for some inducement
to enter that market.
36. The liquid bleach industry was already oligopolistic before the
acquisition, and price competition was certainly not as vigorous as
it would have been if the industry were competitive. Clorox enjoyed
a dominant position nationally, and its position approached monopoly proportions in certain areas. The existence of some 200 fringe
firms certainly does not belie that fact. Nor does the fact, relied
upon by the court below, that after the merger, producers other than
Clorox "were selling more bleach for more money than ever before".
In the same period Clorox increased its share from 48.8% to 52%.
The interjection of Procter into the market considerably changed the
situation. There is every reason to assume that the smaller firms
would become more cautious in competing due to their fear of retaliation by Procter. It is probable that Procter would 'become the price
leader and that oligopoly would become more rigid.
The acquisition may also have the tendency of raising barriers
to new entry.
386 U.S. at 578-79 (citations omitted).
37. Id. at 580.
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Brewing Corp.38 In Falstaff, the Justice Department challenged
the validity of an acquisition agreement between Falstaff Brewing Corp. and the Narragansett Brewing Co. The Government
sought to show a violation of § 7, not only because Falstaff was
a potential entrant currently on the fringe of the market, but
also because it was alleged that: "[Tlhe acquisition eliminated
competition that would have existed had Falstaff entered the
market de novo or by acquisition and expansion of a smaller firm,
a so-called 'toe-hold' acquistion." 39
The district court had found that Falstaff evidenced no intent to enter the market de novo, and thus, could not be considered a potential competitor. In reversing the court, the Supreme Court cited FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co. 40 for the proposition that the lack of intent to enter a market could not be considered conclusive. The Court stated:
The specific question with respect to this phase of the case is
not what Falstaff's internal company decisions were but whether,
given its financial capabilities and conditions in the New England
market, it would be reasonable to consider it a potential entrant
into that market. .

.

. [A]nd if it would appear to rational beer

merchants in New England that Falstaff might well build a new
brewery to supply the northeastern market then its entry by
merger becomes suspect under § 7.41
The Court went on to point out that the real determination was
the extent to which members of the market perceived Falstaff
as a threat, rather than any intent on the part of Falstaff as
to market entry. This intent was relevant but simply not conclusive.

42

Since the Court remanded on the basis of the on-the-fringe
or "wings" argument, it did not reach that part of the Government's argument which would have added a new dimension to
the potential competition theory:
We leave for another day the question of the applicability of §
7 to a merger that will leave competition in the market place
exactly as it was, neither hurt nor helped, and that is challengeable under § 7 only on grounds that the company could, but did
not, enter de novo or through 'toe-hold' acquisition and that
there is less competition
than there would have been had entry
8
been in such a manner. 4
The Court rationalized that this question need not be met because no case had yet given reason for such a determination.
By the time of the Falstaff decision, the potential competi38. 410 U.S. 526 (1972).
39. Id. at 530.
40. 386 U.S.568 (1967).

41. 410 U.S. 526, 533 (1972).
42. Id. at 533-35.
43. Id. at 537.
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tion doctrine had become a familiar weapon to which businesses
were able to give ample consideration when planning expansion.
The argument not reached by the Court in Falstaff, however,
represented a relatively unknown element with which corporations were not acquainted. The gist of the theory, as argued
by the Government, was that, in addition to the "wings" effect
of a potential market entrant, in certain situations future competition would also be lost because the acquiring company would
become entrenched in the market and set up barriers to other
potential entrants. This theory would apply when a large company seeks to enter a market by acquisition of another large firm
that has already achieved success within that market. When this
occurs, the Justice Department contends that potential competition will be thwarted. This contention is based on the idea that
a better way of market entry would be to require the acquiring
company to enter the market either de novo (setting up a new
branch or subsidiary) or through a "toe-hold" acquisition (acquisition of a small, non-dominating firm already in the market).
Developing this idea, the Government argues that a "toehold" or de novo entry will give the area a new face, offering
fresh competition, whereas acquisition of a dominant firm will
result in a destruction of competition. This destruction allegedly
occurs because the acquiring firm will theoretically become such
a dominant factor in the market, having combined its expertise
with the success of the acquiring firm, that all other potential
competitors will decide not to enter. This will eventually result
in the acquiring company becoming entrenched in the market
with resultant monopolistic practices emerging. Therefore, the
Government seeks to halt any acquisition where this possibility
exists. As the Court in Falstaff indicated, 44 all potential competition cases that had been decided, including Falstaff, were decided on the "wings" portion of the potential competition doctrine,45 with the entrenchment or "toe-hold" aspects being saved
'46
"for another day."
Marine Bancorporation
From the El Paso case 47 to the Falstaff decision, 48 the potential competition doctrine had been developed into a very effective and successful tool for battling anti-competitive conduct.
44. Id.

45. See, e.g., FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967);

United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964); United States
v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964); United States v. El Paso
Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964).
46. United States v. Yalstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526 (1972).
47. United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964).
48. United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526 (1972).
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Even though the "toe-hold" aspect of the doctrine had yet to
be adopted by the courts, the "wings" argument had proved to
be a fertile source of antitrust authority. Only in one area,
banking, had the Justice Department consistently met with failure. Seven times their attempts to seek application of the doctrine to banking had been defeated at the district court level. 49
One of those cases, United States v. First National Bancorporation, Inc.,50 had been affirmed by the Supreme Court in a four
to four one-line opinion. So, quite understandably the Justice
Department was anxious to have the Supreme Court treat a
banking case based on potential competition. If, in that treatment, the Court would also face the "toe-hold" question, the Justice Department would have achieved a double victory, assuming
that the decision resulted in rulings favorable to the Government.
Just such a treatment of the unresolved potential competition questions was sought in United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc.5 1 National Bank of Commerce [NBC], a large, nationally
chartered bank based in Seattle, Washington, proposed a merger
with Washington Trust Bank [WTB], a medium size, state-char52
tered bank located at the opposite end of the state in Spokane.
The Justice Department sought to halt the proposed merger on
potential competition grounds, claiming:
[T]hat if the merger is prohibited, the acquiring bank would
find an alternate and more competitive means for entering the
Spokane area and that the acquired bank would ultimately develop by internal expansion or mergers with smaller banks into
an actual competitor of the acquiring bank and other large banks
in sections of the State outside Spokane. The Government further submits that the merger would terminate the alleged procompetitive influence that the acquiring bank presently exerts
over Spokane
banks due to the potential for its entry into that
53
market.
The basic argument propounded by the Justice Department was
49. See United States v. Connecticut National Bank, 362 F. Supp. 240
(Conn. 1973); United States v. United Virginia Bankshares, Inc., 347 F.

Supp. 891 (E.D. Va. 1972); United States v. First National Bancorporation, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 1003 (Colo. 1971); United States v. Idaho First
National Bank, 315 F. Supp. 261 (Idaho, 1970); United States v. First National Bank, 310 F. Supp. 157 (Md. 1970); United States v. First National
Bank, 301 F. Supp. 1161 (S.D. Miss. 1969); United States v. Crocker-An-

glo National Bank, 277 F. Supp. 133 (N.D. Cal. 1967) (three-judge court).
50. 329 F. Supp. 1003 (Colo. 1971), aff'd mem., 410 U.S. 577 (1973).
51. 418 U.S. 602 (1974).

52. National Bank of Commerce is the second largest banking organi-

zation having headquarters in the state of Washington. A wholly owned
subsidiary of Marine Bancorporation, Inc., NBC maintains 107 branches

in the state, none of which are in the metropolitan Spokane area. Washington Trust Bank is the eighth largest bank with headquarters in Washington, operating all seven branches in the Spokane area.

53. 418 U.S. at 605.
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that approval of the merger would preclude the possibility that
NBC would enter Spokane de novo or by acquisition of a smaller
bank and would thus assist in deconcentrating the Spokane
market. 54 The district court dismissed the Government's complaint, whereupon an appeal was taken to the Supreme Court.
On appeal the Supreme Court affirmed the action of the
lower court. However, in doing so the Court extensively considered the potential competition doctrine, both generally and
as applicable to banks. This decision recognizes that, under certain situations, the doctrine is applicable to bank mergers and
acquisitions. The decision offers insight into the present status
of the potential competition theory as well as the possible directions that the doctrine might take in the future.
The Government attempted to introduce the entire state of
Washington as the appropriate geographic market, claiming that
the proposed merger might:
[L]ead eventually to the domination of all banking in the State
by a few large banks, facing each other in a network of local,
oligopolistic banking markets. This assumed eventual statewide
linkage of local markets, it is argued, will enhance statewide
the possibility of parallel, standardized, anticompetitive behavior. 55
The Court, however, held that this area was too broad and that
the proper area for consideration was only that area in which
the acquired firm is an actual, direct competitor.56
Having determined the relevant market area, the Court
turned to the potential competition issue. The Government's
case, as perceived by the Court, proceeded in five steps: (1) that
the potential competition doctrine applies to commercial banking;
(2) that the Spokane market is sufficiently concentrated to invoke the doctrine; (3) that the question left open in Falstaff
should be resolved in the Government's favor; (4) that the
"wings" aspect is applicable in the present case; and (5) that
the merger will eliminate Washington Trust Bank's potential
57
growth outside of Spokane.
The Court first held that geographic market extension mergers by commercial banks must pass muster under the potential
competition doctrine. 58 However, the Court limited this holding
54. Id. at 615.

55. Id. at 620.
56. Id. at 622. The Court found that "section of the country" and

"relevant geographical market" had an identical meaning as applied to

§ 7 cases. See, e.g. United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S.
321' 357-62 (1,963) wherein these terms were defined to be the area in
which goods or services at issue are marketed to a significant degree by
the acquired firm.
57. 418 U.S. at 626.
58. Id. at 627. The Court further held that the "convenience and
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by requiring that any further application of the doctrine must
take into account the federal and state regulatory restrictions
on entry into banking. The Court pointed out that in order to
avoid further defeat in the district court, the Government would
have to take into consideration the extensive regulation unique
to banking. "This omission [failure of the Government to give
weight to the regulation of banks] is of great importance, because ease of entry on the part of the acquiring firm is a central
premise of the potential-competition doctrine."' 9
Regarding the question of concentration, the Court ruled
that Spokane was sufficiently concentrated to warrant application of the potential competition doctrine. The Justice Department had introduced concentration ratios to show that only three
banking organizations controlled almost 92% of total deposits in
Spokane. The Government argued that these ratios evidenced
an oligopolistic market which could easily fall prey to parallel
or other anti-competitive practices as a result of undue market
power.6 0 Pointing out that the potential competition doctrine
has meaning only as applied to concentrated markets, Mr. Justice Powell stated that where a market is already acting competitively, there-is no need for concern that a present acquisition
would preclude long-term market deconcentration:
If the target market performs as a competitive market in traditional antitrust terms, the participants in the market will have
no occasion to fashion their behavior to take into account the
presence of a potential entrant. The present procompetitive
effects that a perceived potential entrant may produce in an
oligopolistic market will already have been accomplished if the
target market is performing competitively. 61
The Court then turned to the question that had' been left
unanswered in Falstaff. The Justice Department had argued
that a de novo or "toe-hold" acquisition would produce deconcentration of the Spokane market because NBC would be required
to compete vigorously to expand its small market share. 62 The
needs" defense available to commercial banks under the Bank Merger
Act of 1966, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1828(c) (5) (B) and (c) (7) (B) is applicable
only after a district court has made a de novo determination of the status of a bank merger under the Clayton Act. That defense provides that
no proposed merger should be approved:
[W]hose effect in any section of the country may be substantially
to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly, or which in
any other manner would be in restraint of trade, unless it finds that
the anticompetitive effects of the proposed transaction are clearly
outweighed in the public interest by the probable effect of the transaction in meeting the convenience and needs of the community to
be served.
59. 418 U.S. at 628.
60. Id. at 631.
61. Id. at 630.
62. Id. at 633.
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Court met this argument by stating two essential preconditions
that had to be proven before the question could be resolved in
the Government's favor. First, it must be shown that National
Bank of Commerce had available means to enter the market
other than by acquisition. Second, it must be shown that those
means of entry "offer a substantial likelihood of ultimately producing deconcentration of that market or other significant pro6' 3
competitive effects.
The Court ruled that, due to heavy regulation of the banking
industry, both on a state and federal level, no other feasible
methods of market entry were available. 4 Therefore, the "toehold" theory could not be applied since the fact situation in
Marine Bancorporation did not warrant such an application. 5
Further, since regulation of the banking industry made de novo
or "toe-hold" entry unlikely, the fourth and fifth points of the
Government's argument also failed. National Bank of Commerce could not possibly be perceived as a threat to the market
under the "wings" theory if members in that market, aware of
the stiff regulatory standards, knew that entry would be difficult or impossible.
In allowing the merger, the Court reiterated that the extensive federal and state regulation of banks must be taken into
account. 6 The Court emphasized the importance of easy market
access as essential to a potential competition argument. Finally,
in all cases, the size and prospective growth of the target market
should be considered in conjunction with the usual potential
competition factors: "[E] conomic feasibility . . . of de novo entry, the capabilities and expansion history of the acquiring firm,
and the performance as well as the structural characteristics of
' 67
the target market.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 638-39. Probably as a result of bank failures during the
1930's, that line of commerce has come under heavy regulation, both on
the state and federal levels. In order for a nationally chartered bank in
Illinois to expand in any capacity, for example, it must comply with the
Illinois Banking Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 16 , §§ 101-82 (1969), the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Reserve Board and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. In addition, any number of federal statutes
may be applicable. As mentioned in the Marine Bancorporation case,
enterprises such as beer producers, as in Falstaff, can expand at a relatively unregulated pace.
65. In the state of Washington, state law would not have allowed
NBC to branch from a small bank, once it was acquired. Thus, NBC
would have no motivation at all to enter the market through a "toe-hold"
acquisition. Also, under state law, NBC could not open any de novo
branches in Spokane. Effectively then, it was inconceivable, from a
business standpoint, that NBC would enter the market in any way other
than by acquisition of an already prosperous bank.
66. 418 U.S. at 639.
67. Id. at 642.
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THE POST-MARINE BANCORPORATION
DOCTRINE OF POTENTIAL COMPETITION

Present Status and Some Speculation
As can be readily discerned from the preceding discussion
of case-law, the potential competition doctrine has gone through
considerable development since 1964. Consequently, a lawyer
faced with the task of assisting his corporate client in an expansion endeavor can ill afford to rely exclusively on any one of
the aforementioned cases. Rather, only by review of a compendium of those decisions can the corporate counsel truly ascertain
the present status of the potential competition doctrine.
The first point that must be fully realized is that the antitrust laws are concerned with the future as well as the present.
Thus, in no situation should counsel think that he has complied
with the statutes simply because his company is guilty of no
present anti-competitive conduct. Since an underlying function
of § 7 of the Clayton Act is to nip anti-competitive conduct in
its "incipiency," it is not surprising that a doctrine developed
that concerned itself with challenging present conduct which
posed the potential for substantially restraining competition at
some future date. Therefore, the potential competition aspect
of § 7 figures to play an increasing role in antitrust litigation.
As discussed earlier, the Government's potential competition
doctrine consists of two separate contentions."" The first of these
is the "wings" argument wherein the acquiring company is perceived by market participants as a present competitive influence
on market behavior because of the threat that it might seek entry
to that market if business conditions warrant such entry. As
a result of this perceived threat "waiting in the wings" for some
inducement to enter, present market participants behave competitively to keep profits down in order to avoid offering that inducement. The theory alleges that these companies will keep
prices low enough to prevent profits from becoming too allur69
ing.
That the "wings" argument has been judicially accepted and
must be considered by corporate planners cannot be doubted.
The cases define certain criteria that must exist before application of this theory will be made. The market must be oligopolistic. As Mr. Justice Powell pointed out in Marine Bancorpora68. The "wings" approach and the "toe-hold" or de novo argument
are the two areas of the potential competition doctrine primarily argued
by the Justice Department in applicable § 7 cases.
69. See generally Note, United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corporation: POTENTIAL COMPETITION RE-EXAMINED, 72 MIcH. L. REv. 837, 841
(1974).
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tion,70 the doctrine can only apply to a concentrated market.
This is supposedly true because price-limiting can only be accomplished by companies in a position to fix prices, i.e., dominant
firms exercising parallel behavior. If this behavior is not currently in existence, according to Mr. Justice Powell, as when the
market is already competitive, then the acquiring firm will not
be exerting the type of competitive influence that must be preserved. Restated, if the market is already competitive, then the
procompetitive effects produced by the potential entrant will
have already been accomplished, thus rendering moot any attempt to deny the acquisition based on a potential competition
theory.
The argument that the doctrine can only apply to a concentrated market has certain failings. Is it not possible that, despite
a competitive, non-oligopolistic market, a successful and confident firm might still seek to enter? After all, the market must
have something to offer or there would not be firms in the market already in competition. The "wings" theory presupposes that
an acquiring firm only wants to acquire a dominant company
in the market. While that may be true, if the market itself is
attractive, the acquiring firm might seek entry despite the lack
of any clear dominant force that it can acquire. Consequently,
the companies already in the market will still perceive that firm
as a potential entrant which will have a further competitive influence on the already competitive market. Therefore, it is possible, although it has not yet been attempted, that the potential
competition doctrine could be applied to a non-concentrated market. The practitioner must be aware of that possibility.
Another problem with the concentrated market criteria is
the fact that reasonable men could differ as to what extent a
market is concentrated or whether it is concentrated at all. In
Marine Bancorporation,71 as in other cases decided under § 7,

the Government relied upon Concentration ratios 72 which can

have a variety of interpretations. Even assuming that both parties can agree to the criteria for determining levels of concentration, those parties might disagree on the relevant geographical
market to which that level should be applied. For example, in
United States v. Connecticut National Bank,7 3 decided the same
70. 418 U.S. at 630.
71. 418 U.S. 602 (1974).
72. Id. at 631. Concentration ratios measure the percent of sales attributable to certain specified firms in the relevant market. Many authorities differ as to the percent needed to constitute a concentrated market, as well as the number of firms to which that percent should be applied. See, e.g., U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE MERGER GUIDELINES, 1 TRADE
REG. REP. 4510, at 6884 (1971); C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, ANTrrusT POLIcY: AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 72 (1959).

73. 418 U.S. 656 (1974).
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day as Marine Bancorporation, the Supreme Court reversed a
district court decision for the Government, remanding the case
for a determination of the relevant geographic market.7 4 Thus,
it is obvious that the entire issue of what market is relevant,
and whether or not it is sufficiently concentrated, is still in a
state of flux.
In the absence of clear guidelines for ascertaining the relevant geographic market or relevant level of concentration in that
market, the corporate lawyer would be advised to assume an unfavorable definition of the relevant geographic market in planning a business combination.
In recent cases, 75 the Justice Department has sought a broad

definition of the relevant geographic market in order to test its
"linked oligopolies" theory. 76 However, a broad market definition will necessarily dilute the effect of concentration ratios because the larger the area that is included in a market, the smaller
the percentage of total market shares that a select number of
firms will hold.7

7

Therefore, if the Government does challenge

an acquisition or merger by using a large market area as its
measure, counsel should then move to show that the concentration level of the market is not sufficient to warrant application
of the potential competition doctrine. As discussed above, the
courts seem to feel that a concentrated market is essential to
the potential competition theory.
Because the Supreme Court has been reluctant to accept the
broad definitions of relevant geographic market propounded by
the Justice Department," it is quite likely that they will continue
to do so. Thus, the corporate planner must be prepared to meet
the concentrated market argument head-on. Probably the most
successful way to do this, as the cases seem to indicate, is to
show that entry de novo or by "toe-hold" acquisition is virtually
impossible. Further, it must be shown that present market par74. The Government had argued that the entire state of Connecticut
was the relevant geographic market. This theory was based on the con-

tention that the proposed consolidation between Connecticut National
Bank and the First Haven National Bank would lead to linked oligopolies throughout Connecticut. The Supreme Court determined that
this notion was too speculative.
The Justice Department had relied exclusively on Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas and town boundaries for proof of concentration.
The Court ruled that these were significant, but not controlling.
75. See, e.g., United States v. Connecticut National Bank 418 U.S. 656
(1974); United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S 602 (1974).
76. Note 74 supra.
77. Also, if concentration ratios use only a limited number of firms
as indicia of the level of concentration, their share of the total market
isreduced by each additional firm that is included as the definition of
the geographic market is expanded.
78. 418 U.S. 656 (1974).

432

The John Marshall Journal of Practice and Procedure [Vol. 8:415

ticipants are also aware of this fact. This suggestion is derived
from the potential competition cases already decided.
United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp.79 points out that
an essential factor is whether a firm is perceived by those in
the relevant market as a potential entrant rather than whether
or not that firm really intends to enter. That being the case,
evidence of a lack of intent to enter means little if other firms
are apprehensive of such entry. Also, as pointed out in United
States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co.,80 and again in United States
v. Continental Can Co., 81 a company's ability to enter a market
is material in determining if the "wings" doctrine is applicable.
FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co. expanded this concept 8 2 to include
the notion of the "most likely entrant". These concepts basically
suggest that a necessary condition precedent to application of
the potential competition doctrine is the ease of entry available
to the acquiring firm. If de novo or "toe-hold" entry is readily
available to a firm in the future, the Government is more likely
to succeed in its attempt to block the acquisition or merger
presently challenged. Accordingly, it is of primary importance
that the converse situation be shown to exist. The impossibility
of future de novo or "toe-hold" entry must be shown to the court.
How, exactly, does a corporate counsel convince the court
that entry can only be achieved by means of the acquisition
presently under challenge? Marine Bancorporationgives a clue:
[E]ssential preconditions must exist before it is possible to resolve whether the Government's theory, if proven, establishes a
violation of § 7. It must be determined: (i) that in fact NBC
has available feasible means for entering the Spokane market
other than by acquiring WTB; and (ii) that those means offer a
substantial likelihood of ultimately producing deconcentration
of
83
that market or other significant procompetitive effects.
Thus, the Justice Department must show that a de novo or "toehold" entry at some future date was possible or else the entire
potential competition argument collapses.
In ruling that the Government had failed to show available,
feasible means of entry, the Court cited the state and federal
regulatory structure which controls banking.8 4 Because of this
structure, National Bank of Commerce had no significant means
by which it could enter the Spokane market at a future date.
Therefore, the argument that National Bank of Commerce would
serve as a competitive influence by its threat of potential entry
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

410
376
378
386
418

U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.

526 (1974).
651 (1964).
441 (1964).
568 (1967).
at 633.

84. Id. at 632-39.
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was absolutely groundless. Furthermore, present market participants would be aware of the strict regulation of bank expansion
and would thus not perceive National Bank of Commerce as a
threat. As a result, the Justice Department was unable to prove
the first essential precondition for establishing a violation of §
7.
What significance does the Court's reference to the heavy
regulation of banking hold in a non-banking case? Obviously,
in any situation where the likelihood of de novo or "toe-hold"
entry is small, the Government will find it difficult to stop the
challenged business combination. In Marine Bancorporation,Mr.
Justice Powell conceded that his decision relied primarily on the
fact that state statutory regulation provided a barrier to de novo
entry.8 5 However, he also stated that in cases where regulatory
restraints are not determinative:
[C]ourts should consider the factors that are pertinent to any
potential-competition case, including the economic feasibility and
likelihood of de novo entry, the capabilities and expansion history of the acquiring firm, and the performance as well as the
structural characteristics of the target market8s
Within that brief summation lies the key to Marine Bancorporation and quite likely the key to future potential competition decisions as well. Regulatory restraint is one factor in determining economic feasibility and likelihood of de novo entry.
It is probably true, as the Court stressed,"7 that the degree of
regulatory restraint in the banking industry is greater than in
other lines of commerce. However, the Court is ultimately concerned with a company's ability to enter a given market. If a
company can convince the Court that some impediment to entry
exists of the same stature as banking's regulatory restraints, the
Court will logically be compelled to dismiss the application of
the potential competition doctrine.
In order to convince the Court of the existence of an impediment to entry, it is suggested that Mr. Justice Powell's words,
as quoted above, be utilized. If, for example, a Procter & Gamble
or a Falstaff can show that any de novo or "toe-hold" acquisition
would be so economically infeasible that they would never consider such an entry without risking a shareholder's suit, isn't this
argument totally responsive to Mr. Justice Powell's criteria? On
its face, this seems to be a valid argument, yet this could not
85. Id. at 641-42.
86. Id. at 642.
87. [I]t blinks reality to conclude that the opportunity for entry
through sponsorship, assuming its availability, is comnarable to the
entry alternatives open to unregulated industries such as those involved in this Court's prior potential-competition cases ....
Id. at 637 (footnotes omitted).
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have been the meaning intended. Actually, the balance of the
conclusion in Marine Bancorporationmust be considered as well.
In addition to the factor of economic feasibility of entry, one
must also consider the performance and structure of the target
market. Only when these factors are read in conjunction does
the Court's true intent emerge. Thus, a Procter & Gamble or
a Falstaff would probably prove successful in propounding the
above argument if the target market was structured in such a
manner that their present entry would benefit the public. If,
however, no such public benefit can be shown, the economic
argument would probably not suffice.
The second aspect of the potential competition theory is the
contention that present acquisition of an already dominant market participant will result in entrenchment ,by the acquiring company, thus ending competitive behavior in the market.8 8 Although the Court in Falstaff,9 and again in Marine Bancorporation,90 refused to apply this portion of the theory, stating that
the facts did not warrant such application, it is suggested that
the same criteria already discussed in reference to the "wings"

argument is applicable here as well. The two aspects seem to
be interrelated and the only distinction lies in the approach given
to one aspect as opposed to the other. Under the "wings" theory,
the present market acquisition is challenged because it will allegedly bring to a halt the competitive influence of the acquiring
firm as a potential entrant. Under the entrenchment theory, the
same present market acquisition is challenged on the ground that
the present entry by acquisition will lead to entrenchment and
destroy the hopes for future competition that would occur if an
entry de novo was required instead.
Both of these theories have as their basis the loss of the
future competitive influence of the acquiring firm. Both are
totally dependent upon the ease of entry available at some future
date. Both are concerned only with the acquisition of an already
dominant firm in the market, otherwise the acquisition would
be the very de novo or "toe-hold" acquisition urged by the Government. Since the identical criteria apply to both aspects, it
is difficult to conceive of a fact sitution where only one would
'be applicable. 91 Thus, probably the only reason that the en88. This is the "unanswered question" of United States v. Falstaff
Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526 (1973). This contention has been defined
in detail earlier in the discussion.
89. Id.
90. 418 U.S. 602 (1974).
91. If, under the "wings" theory, a firm acquires a dominant firm in
the new market, it is alleged that the competitive loss is due to the fact
that the acquiring firm is no longer a threat, since it has entered the mar-

ket. Because the acquisition is necessarily of a dominant firm (why else

would the acquisition be challenged?) this is the same fact situation upon

1975]

The Potential Competition Doctrine

trenchment argument has remained an unanswered question is
because the cases have already been won or lost on the much
older "wings" approach. There is, then, only one real potential
competition "doctrine" which is based upon certain specific criteria that can be applied through interdependent arguments.
CONCLUSION

Businessmen interested in expansion will have to consider
the legal developments of the doctrine as they make plans for
growth. In assisting his corporate client, the attorney must bear
in mind the basic underlying rational of the potential competi92
tion theory.
93
The doctrine has grown in scope to include joint ventures,
and challenges to firms that only present the potential for expansion into the relevant product market. 94 Relevant geographic
markets can range in size from that of a metropolitan area 95 to
the entire nation as a whole.96 Lines of commerce include men's,
98
women's, and children's shoes, 97 as well as liquid bleach.
In summary, there are certain elements of a business expansion that should be considered. Initially, the size of the firm
to be acquired is important. If that firm is, itself, a dominant
or even significant influence on the activity in its market, this
fact should serve as a warning to the acquiring firm. In response
which the entrenchment theory is based.
In order to nurture the growth of a free enterprise system, while at
the same time retaining a competitive business economy, the correct balance of freedom of action as opposed to the imposition of a variety of
restraints is required. To achieve this proper balance, Congress has
chosen to create statutory language in the area of antitrust that is broad
in scope. See Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as
amended 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-8 (1958); Clayton Act, ch. 323 38 Stat. 730 (1914),
as amended 15 U.S. C. §§ 12-27 (1958 and Supp. I 1961). There are several reasons for the retention of broad, sweeping language in this area.
Specific statutory enumeration of violative conduct would soon result in
circumvention of the spirit of the law by certain parties who could nevertheless avoid prosecution due to compliance with the "letter" of the law.
Secondly, our economy is a varied economy. Language intended to
limit conduct by certain types of industry or in certain types of markets
would also limit that same conduct in industries or markets where no
such limitation was intended.
The responsibility for applying the necessarily broad provisions of
our antitrust laws has fallen on the courts, on the Federal Trade Commission, and the Department of Justice, along with certain other federal regulatory agencies. Both of these sectors-the judicial and the executive branches-have much discretion in their respective interpretation
and application of the laws. Theoretically, both reflect by deed, the attitudes of the majority of Americans as to what business practices are performed for the public good.
92. Note 91 supra.
93. United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964).
94. United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964).
95. United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602 (1974).
96. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
97. Id.
98. FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
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to this warning the acquiring firm should prepare itself for a
possible § 7 battle. This preparation should include the gathering of market concentration evidence as well as the drafting of
arguments that can be utilized to prove that future de novo entry
would not be economically feasible. Finally, extensive material
should be prepared which convincingly demonstrates that the
proposed merger or acquisition will benefit the public in the target market by improved service and increased competition.
The proposed business combination doomed to failure will
be a merger or acquisition of a dominant market participant in
a concentrated market.9 9 The acquiring firm will not be able
to demonstrate that a future de novo or "toe-hold" acquisition
is out of the question. There will be no convincing evidence of
public benefits resulting from the proposed acquisition.
The potential competition doctrine has directly affected the
expansion plans of those businesses discussed in the cases outlined herein. The real impact of the doctrine, however, rests
with the effect that it has on the firms that must take the theory
into account during the planning stage of expansion. Hopefully,
these firms will engage in market studies and seek legal guidance
in order to avoid the pitfalls that the potential competition doctrine offers to the unprepared. Those firms that do not so prepare will be the subject of future judicial interpretation of that
doctrine.
William E. Dorigan

99. But see notes 72, 77 supra.

